

Chapter 14

Measuring Corruption: Exploring the Iceberg

Leo Huberts, Karin Lasthuizen and Carel Peeters¹

Introduction

Existing knowledge on corruption offers only a limited number of shared insights by researchers and practitioners. We all agree that corruption is an important and complex phenomenon and we agree that we disagree about its content. There are many different theories and conceptual frameworks, which lead to a multitude of descriptions, explanations and evaluations. As a consequence, to attempt to measure ‘corruption’ is, by definition, a risky and much disputed endeavour.

This is certainly true in an international context. However, it also upholds when corruption is studied within the context of one country – even when it concerns a small country with a comparatively positive corruption reputation such as, the Netherlands. In this chapter, we will present information about corruption research in this Western European country with about 16 million inhabitants.

Firstly, we will clarify the concepts that we will be using. Corruption is but one of the many integrity violations that can be distinguished. It is important to be clear about its relationship with related types of unethical behaviour – for example, fraud, theft, conflict of interest and abuse of resources. Our aim is to add to existing research and theory by the incorporation of the corruption concept into a broader theory of ethics and integrity of governance. Of course, this also has consequences for the appropriate research agenda and methodology, which we will also discuss.

There are numerous available methods that attempt to measure corruption and other integrity violations and which offer challenging possibilities for research on corruption. We have chosen to use multiple methods and through this ‘triangulation’ to increase our knowledge of corruption in the Netherlands. Our focus is an empirical one. By presenting the available research methodology and results concerning corruption in our country, we hope to contribute to this book’s endeavour. Throughout this chapter, we will delve into questions concerning measurement and methodologies by describing different types of research that we have conducted, present some of our results, and reflect on the usefulness and limitations of the different research projects and methods.

In the third section, we will summarise the results of corruption reputation research. What has been the result of Transparency’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) research on the Netherlands and how does this relate to the expert panel research that has

been done? Because Galtung and others discuss this type of research extensively in this volume, we will be brief about its contribution to our knowledge on the extent of corruption.

In the fourth section, we will present and discuss the methodology and results of research on internal corruption investigations in (local) governmental organisations. Even though it is self-evident that only a limited number of actual corruption cases will be discovered, it is worthwhile to collect information about these investigations. This is particularly true when cross-sectoral or longitudinal data become available. We researched internal investigations on corruption and fraud in municipal government in 1991 and 2002 and there is information available about these investigations within police forces for the years 1999–2000.

The third type of research focuses more directly on corruption itself. Surveys which estimate the extent of corrupt behaviour in the work environment clarify that there is much more corruption than the internal investigations detect. It also becomes clear that bribery seems to be exceptional but that corruption-related types of unethical behaviour within organisations are not. The validity of this information clearly exceeds the validity of perception and internal investigation research. However, what we discover is also limited. The knowledge of employees and managers about the presence of corruption is, by definition, deficient.

Self-reports might offer possibilities for more valid information to be collected. In the sixth section we will present an example of a survey among victims: how often are citizens confronted with (the necessity of) bribing public sector functionaries. Another promising route are self-reports of actual deviant behaviour, collected with ‘Randomised Response Techniques’. We outline this research.

The last section discusses our overall attempts to measure corruption. What do we know about (the level of) corruption in the Netherlands? And how do the presented methods contribute to our knowledge? We conclude that it is necessary to triangulate on the same research object. Corruption research should involve the collection and comparison of information from different sources and methods, at different levels and in different sectors as well as in different points in time.

Concepts and Methods

In this section, we give a brief conceptual and methodological outline of our research. First, we outline our definition of corruption; discuss the merits of studying corruption from a broader perspective; and, present a typology of integrity violations. Second, we give an overview of the different types of research that we have conducted, or are planning to conduct, and explain how these projects relate to the problem of measuring corruption and other integrity violations.

Corruption and Integrity

Conceptual clarity between integrity, ethics and corruption is important, especially when it concerns public debate, policy-making and theory development on an international level. The concept of corruption is most often at the heart of that debate (Barker and Carter, 1996; Bull and Newell, 2003; Caiden, 1991; Caiden, Dwivedi and Jabbra, 2001; Crank and Caldero, 2000; Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2002; Menzel and Carson, 1999; Preston, Sampford and Connors, 2002). It is, therefore, important to be aware of at least three definitions of corruption. First, there is a more specific or narrow interpretation that is often found in definitions of corruption or bribing in legal frameworks. In the Netherlands, for example, corruption in the penal law is equated with 'bribing' (giving or accepting a bribe). This presupposes that a functionary is acting in the interest of another actor because of the advantages promised or given to him. Second, corruption is interpreted as 'behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence' (Nye, 1967, p. 419; also see Caiden, 2001; and Gardiner, 2002). The same elements can be found in the definition used in the work of international organisations against corruption: corruption as the abuse of office for private gain (Pope, 2000). All of these definitions portray corruption as a breach of moral behavioural norms and values involving private interests. However, the presence of a third party is not seen as conditional.

The third and broadest definition views corruption as synonymous with all types of violations of moral norms and values. Almost inevitably, this brings us to a concept that has become prominent in the discussion in many countries: integrity (Fijnaut and Huberts, 2002; Huberts and Van den Heuvel, 1999; Klockars, 1997; Klockars et al., 2000; Montefiori and Vines, 1999; Uhr, 1999). We define integrity as the quality of acting in accordance with the relevant moral values, norms and rules. Integrity is a quality of individuals (Klockars, 1997; Solomon, 1999) as well as of organisations (Kaptein and Wempe, 2002). Additionally, ethics can be defined as the collection of values and norms, functioning as standards or yardsticks for assessing the integrity of one's conduct (Benjamin, 1990). The moral nature of these values and norms refers to what is judged as right, just, or good conduct. Values are principles that carry a certain weight in one's choice of action (what is good to do, or bad to refrain from doing). Norms indicate morally correct behaviour in a certain situation. Values and norms guide action and provide a moral basis to justify or evaluate what one does and who one is (Lawton, 1998; Pollock, 1998).

In our research we use a typology of categories of integrity violations as developed by Huberts et al. (1999). This typology was the outcome of an analysis of the literature on police integrity and corruption and was assessed against the results of empirical research on internal investigations in the police force. Table 14.1 gives the integrity violations or forms of public misconduct that can be distinguished (Van den Heuvel, Huberts and Verberk, 1999).

The typology clarifies that integrity or appropriate behaviour means much more than not being corrupt. Nevertheless it goes without saying that corruption,

or 'behaviour on the part of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or those associated with them, by the misuse of the public power entrusted to them', is a crucial aspect of organisational integrity.

Table 14.1 Types of integrity violations

1	<i>Corruption: bribing</i> Misuse of public power for private gain; asking, offering, accepting bribes.
2	<i>Corruption: nepotism, cronyism, patronage</i> Misuse of public authority to favour friends, family, party.
3	<i>Fraud and theft</i> Improper private gain acquired from the organisation (with no involvement of external actors).
4	<i>Conflict of (private and public) interest</i> Personal interest (through assets, jobs, gifts etc.) Interferes (or might interfere) with public interest.
5	<i>Improper use of authority (for noble causes)</i> To use illegal/improper methods to achieve organisational goals (within the police for example illegal methods of investigation and disproportionate violence).
6	<i>Misuse and manipulation of information</i> Lying, cheating, manipulating information, breaching confidentiality of information.
7	<i>Discrimination and sexual harassment</i> Misbehaviour towards colleagues or citizens and customers.
8	<i>Waste and abuse of resources</i> Failure to comply with organisational standards, improper performance, incorrect or dysfunctional internal behaviour.
9	<i>Private life misconduct</i> Conduct in one's private life which harms the public's trust in administration/government.

Why More Diversity and Complexity?

We have moved from corruption and fraud research towards integrity violations research. It is important to understand the reasons for this development towards more 'diversity and complexity'.

The first and most obvious reason is that it adds to our knowledge of the phenomenon under study. The description and analysis of the moral dimension of the behaviour of individuals and organisations is enriched by the availability of a more extended conceptual framework. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to distinguish more clearly the subtypes of corrupt behaviour that are included.

The second reason has to do with the implications of using an overall concept for a broad range of behaviour for our evaluation of the corruptness or integrity of individuals and organisations. We also need tools (or concepts) to distinguish morally between different types of integrity violations. When various forms of misconduct are all under one label, they are all then strapped onto the operating table for just one type of verdict; misconduct is ‘corrupt’ or ‘it is not’. This can lead to oversimplification, over-generalisation and/or immediate condemnation (‘integritism’ or ‘corruptism’) (Huberts, 2005).

The third reason is that insight into integrity violations is supposed to be important to understand the amount and character of corruption in a more specific sense. The ‘slippery slope’ hypothesis suggests that serious corruption cases have started with minor offences (possibly within a culture without clear norms). As a consequence, we might learn more about the extent and character of corruption when related phenomena are also studied and measured.

The fourth aspect has to do with our research agenda which includes questions about the causes of ‘corruption’ and the effectiveness of ‘anti-corruption’ policies. A lesson we are learning is that umbrella concepts are limiting the possibilities to progress our knowledge about unacceptable and unethical behaviour. Patronage and favouritism might be caused by other factors other than bribing, or private misbehaviour, or fraud, or conflict of interest. This means that organisations or governments will have to develop specific policies against different types of integrity violations including corruption.

The last more practical reason simply has to do with the country we are working in. When serious bribery, nepotism and patronage are exceptional, other types of unethical behaviour become more decisive for the legitimacy and credibility of the political and administrative system. Examples are conflict of interest through sideline activities, fraud and private life misbehaviour.

Measurement

Of course, the shifting focus from corruption and fraud to integrity violations also has consequences on our measurement and measurement methods agenda. In the rest of this chapter, we will present a number of research projects that include corruption as well as other integrity violations.

At the same time, we are still interested in collecting information about corruption itself. We have been attempting to progress by selecting different aspects of the corruption phenomenon and by using different methodologies to measure those aspects (self-reports, reports from the working environment, internal investigations, criminal cases, reputations). Figure 14.1 clarifies the different methods we will describe in this chapter and how they relate to the iceberg-like structure of the corruption problem.




Figure 14.1 Types of research on the extent of corruption in the Netherlands

Corruption Reputation Research

One of the most common and most discussed methods to measure corruption is reputation research. The common basis is that respondents are asked to estimate the amount of corruption in their environment, their organisation, their sector of society or their country.

Most prominent is the last type of research, including the Transparency Corruption Perception Index. As part of our exploration of the iceberg, it is inevitable to pay attention to this line of research. Therefore, we will summarise the CPI for the Netherlands and we will deliberately do that for a longer time period. Over the years, the Netherlands appears to be non-corrupt in the eyes of the business people and risk analysts that estimate the country's integrity. This image is confirmed by additional research undertaken by us in 1994 among 257 experts from 49 countries, including experts from the Netherlands.

CPI for the Netherlands

The Netherlands appears to be non-corrupt in the eyes of the business people and risk analysts that estimate a country's integrity for the CPI. The much discussed Corruption Perception Index for 2004 shows that the Netherlands rank 10th with a score of 8.7

based on 10 surveys and with a confidence rate of 8.5-8.9. The positive image of the Netherlands is rather stable, as Table 14.2 shows.

Table 14.2 Corruption reputation of European countries 1980–2004

	1985	1988	1996	1998	2000	2002	2003	2004
	1988	1992						
The Netherlands	8.4	9.0	8.7	9.0	8.9	9.0	8.9	8.7
Finland	8.1	8.9	9.1	9.6	10.0	9.7	9.7	9.7
Sweden	8.1	8.7	9.1	9.5	9.4	9.3	9.3	9.2
United Kingdom	8.0	8.3	8.4	8.7	8.7	8.7	8.7	8.6
Germany	8.1	8.1	8.3	7.9	7.6	7.3	7.7	8.2
France	8.4	7.5	7.0	6.7	6.7	6.3	6.9	7.1
Spain	6.8	5.1	4.3	6.1	7.0	7.1	6.9	7.1
Belgium	8.3	7.4	6.8	5.4	6.1	7.1	7.6	7.5
Italy	4.9	4.3	3.4	4.6	4.6	5.2	5.3	4.8

In comparison to other countries in the European Union, the Netherlands is seen as relatively clean. Scandinavian countries enjoy an even better reputation, but the reputation of the Netherlands is consistently better than that of European Union countries like Germany, France or Belgium.

The Bribe Payers Index is slightly less positive about the involvement of Dutch citizens and companies in international corruption. The Netherlands remains among the ten countries on the list with the least perceived willingness to bribe foreign public servants but the score is 7.8 – less ‘clean’ than the CPI.

Expert Panel Survey

In 1994, we organised an international expert panel survey (Huberts, 1996) in which 257 respondents from 49 countries responded to a questionnaire about public corruption and fraud, about the conditions which cause these violations of public integrity and about the methods and strategies which are considered effective to combat public corruption and fraud. The survey covered all participants at three big international conferences on corruption and the members of the corruption research group in the political science association.

The resulting panel of experts represented different countries and different occupational backgrounds. From the respondents, 75 were from Western Europe, 4 from Eastern Europe, 65 from Asia, 14 from Oceania, 55 from North America, 37 from Latin America and 7 from Africa. Among them were scientists (38 per cent), representatives from the police and the judiciary (28 per cent), from the civil service and anti corruption agencies (12 per cent), auditors, controllers, accountants (10 per cent) and businessmen and consultants (8 per cent).

Such variety of expert opinion conveys information which has to be seen in the proper context. All data are the result of opinions, estimations and guesses by respondents. By selecting specific respondents, these opinions and guesses are considered to be 'expert' opinions and 'educated' guesses but it must not be forgotten that the survey is concerned with opinion research. The research is not about actual cases of corruption and fraud in a country, but about views on corruption and fraud from experts in the field. Views say something about reality but they must not be confounded with it.

We report here the experts' estimates of the amount of corruption and fraud in their own country. We defined such violations in line with the definitions discussed previously. Public functionaries are corrupt when they act (or do not act) as a result of the personal rewards offered to them by interested private actors. Public fraud is private gain at public expense without the involvement of outside actors. Public corruption and fraud both mean the misuse of public power for private gain (including gain for one's own family, group or party). The following table clarifies the estimated amount of corruption and fraud by the participating experts in their own country, aggregated for different parts of the world.

Table 14.3 Extent of public corruption and fraud (expert panel 1994)

	n	Politicians		Public servants	
		Median %	Mean %	Median %	Mean %
Western Europe	75	5.0	10.2	5.0	6.5
Eastern Europe	4	10.0	15.1	15.0	22.9
Asia	65	25.0	32.3	15.0	22.1
Oceania	14	5.0	10.5	4.5	9.3
North America	55	13.0	22.5	5.0	11.3
Latin America	37	40.0	45.2	33.0	37.3
Africa	7	60.0	48.6	50.0	47.9
<i>Total</i>	257	10.0	25.2	10.0	18.0

The 35 Dutch experts who participated in the survey estimated the extent of public corruption and fraud among politicians as 2.5 per cent and among civil servants as 4 per cent. They were pessimistic about the future. In 1994, 79 per cent thought that the extent of corruption and fraud would increase (Fleurke and Huberts, 1995, pp. 392–93).

Discussing the Reliability and Validity of Reputation Research

Over and over again, the surveys on the reputation of corruption and fraud in the Netherlands result in a similar pattern. The reliability of this type of work is not the

problem. Different research firms and researchers use different types of public but the results are more or less the same. Illustrative is the relationship between our 1994 panels judgment on the corruption of countries and the Transparency CPI data of 1995. The Spearman correlation coefficient, which indicates the measure of association between these two datasets, amounts to 0.88.

Another statistic is interesting for the assessment of the usefulness of reputation data. In the expert panel, we asked every respondent to estimate the amount of corruption in their own country and we also asked everybody to rate 21 selected countries on a seven point scale concerning the level of public corruption and fraud. This enabled us to compare the two results for the countries represented by respondents (we incorporated the countries with three or more participants). The estimated corruption level of a country by the whole panel appeared to be related significantly to the experts' estimation of the amount of corruption for their own country (Spearman correlation coefficient amounts to 0.91, $p = 0,00$).

Nevertheless, the stability of these expert estimations is also a pitfall in terms of validity. A reputation is something that is built up over the years, because, as the term 'reputation' suggests, it is about how a country or organisation has come to be known. Therefore, reputations refer to general perceptions, not to specific (expert) experiences. In other words, the problem is that an order of reputations is based on already preconceived reputations. Known or felt reputations carry themselves into reputation research. This observation is problematic because the power of reputation research is believed to be the opportunity it gives for comparison and not its ability to make accurate estimations of the actual level of the corruption problem.

To conclude our sketch of reputation research, one extra aspect is worth mentioning. Because the discussion about reputation research centres around the failures to measure the extent of the problem, it is sometimes forgotten that the method might be more useful to collect information about other characteristics of corruption. In our expert panel research, we also tried to find out what conditions and causes are considered to be important and what strategies to combat corruption seemed to work in different countries.

Research on Criminal Cases and Internal Investigations

Corruption reputation research can provide interesting data regarding views on the extent of corruption and the mechanisms that underlie public wrongdoing. However, this type of research finds itself outside the proverbial 'iceberg' of corrupt administrative behaviour, as it is concerned with opinions, instead of data on or evidence of actual cases of corruption, fraud or other integrity violations.

The proverbial iceberg, depicting the actual structure of corruption and other integrity violations, is very complex: of all the actual cases of corruption, only a part makes itself felt or visible in the direct work environment; only a limited number of these cases are reported, leading to the occasional internal investigation; these investigations do not always lead to satisfactory evidence or a criminal investigation as a follow-up; and the criminal cases do not always lead to a conviction.

We will start at the top of the iceberg and provide an overview of empirical research on criminal cases of corruption in the Netherlands. This is followed by a view of our research into internal investigations in the Dutch municipalities and police force on which we hinge methodological problems (which will be discussed at the end of this section).

Research on Criminal Cases

Criminal cases form the top of our corruption iceberg. In these cases, the evidence of incidence is most fully crystallised. What we know about criminal cases in the Netherlands stems from various other researchers. In 1991, Hoetjes (1991) concluded that, in the period 1965 to 1989, annually 16 to 19 cases of corruption by public officials were brought under the attention of the criminal judge in the Netherlands. Approximately, two thirds of these cases did not result in a criminal conviction that is, about 6 convictions a year between 1965 and 1989.

On the basis of data released by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Bovens (1996, pp. 151–52) found that in the period 1990–1994 hardly any convictions for corruption in the public sphere were imposed. Van Hulst (2002, pp. 17–18) provided an overview of the afore mentioned cases for the years 1994 to 1998 based on data from the Dutch Ministry of Justice. In that period a total of 233 cases were brought to the attention of the criminal judge, of which 87 were followed by a conviction that is, approximately 17 convictions *per annum*.

When we compare the data over the years 1994–1998 with the available data over the preceding years, the perception is that the number of convictions has risen. This trend is also visible in the last years, due to changes in the penal code that make it easier to prove bribery (Nelen and Nieuwendijk, 2003).

The image that follows from these inquiries is that the top structure of the Netherlands corruption iceberg has been rather stable for a long time (with about 20 criminal cases and six convictions each year) but there is a tendency towards more criminal cases (50 cases with 17 convictions). For a country with 16 million inhabitants and a public sector which consists of 23 to 61 officials *per* thousand residents (dependant on which sectors are classified as ‘public’), the Netherlands appears to be virtually corruption free. However, there are some difficulties with the interpretation of the available data.

First of all, it could be that the criminal cases, which by law are directed towards individual suspects, are representative of even fewer corruption cases, as it is possible to have multiple suspects for one case of corruption. There are no data available on this point. Second, the data are comparable to only a limited degree because they are provided by different organisations and it remains unclear exactly which articles in the penal code are taken into account in the various cases. Thirdly, the data over-represents officials from the municipal system and the police force. We are currently conducting systematic research on criminal cases to address these three issues.

Most importantly, there is the issue of the ‘dark numbers’. With such data alone, it is impossible to assess how these convictions relate to the actual prevalence and

extent of corruption (and other integrity violations). Data on criminal cases, as well as data on internal investigations, only provide circumstantial evidence regarding prevalence and incidence.

Research on Internal Investigations in Local Dutch Government

Research on internal investigations moves us towards the ‘middle ground’ of our iceberg. Internal investigations might follow out of reports in the work environment and can lead to the criminal cases we have just discussed. We have conducted research on internal investigations within the Dutch municipal system as well as within the Dutch police force.

To answer questions regarding the amount of internal investigations into fraud and corruption in the Dutch municipal system, we conducted a survey in 1991 with a random sample of town clerks in various Dutch cities (Huberts, 1993; 1995). In Dutch cities, the town clerk is an important public functionary. He or she assists all-important political bodies in the municipal system, functioning as secretariat and adviser to these bodies. Also, the town clerk is responsible for the administrative personnel and coordinates the different parts of the official machinery of the municipality. These characteristics mean that whenever a case of fraud or corruption is officially investigated, the town clerk is the functionary most likely to know about it. In this survey, the main question was how many investigations of corruption and fraud the town clerk was aware of during his or her career.

To look at the changes over the years in internal investigations in the municipal system, the survey was repeated in 2003 (Huberts et al., 2004). That time, all town clerks of all the Dutch municipalities received a questionnaire which contained the same questions as in the 1991 survey. The main question was how many investigations of corruption and fraud took place in the preceding 5 years. Table 14.4 provides the extrapolated mean results of the internal investigations for the 1991 and 2003 research.

Table 14.4 Yearly amount of internal corruption and fraud investigations

	1991	2003	2003
	Mean over the preceding years	Mean over the preceding years (without Amsterdam)	Mean over the preceding years (with Amsterdam)
Number of investigations a year	102	103	179
<i>Ratio</i>			
Corruption	46%	47%	34%
Fraud	54%	53%	66%

The data provided by one municipality, the Dutch capital Amsterdam, especially proved to be problematic as well as an indication on what might be an ‘integrity paradox’. When assessing the first two data columns, the keyword seems ‘stability’. There was little apparent change on the extent and nature of corruption. The 1991 and 2003 surveys both indicate about 100 internal investigations a year, of which approximately half concern corruption. A remarkable result considering that in 1992 the late Minister of the Interior, Dales, gave two public speeches which put the theme of corruption on the administrative map. Since then the attention to, and awareness of, corruption and other forms of official misconduct have increased in the public arena. This apparent stability raises intriguing questions: have the concerns over administrative integrity taken gross forms as corruption is a very limited problem in the Netherlands; or is there a continuous underestimation of the problem?

The distribution of reported investigations over our respondents in the 2003 survey provides some clues to the above-mentioned questions. Over 60 per cent of the respondents, many of whom are from sizeable and populous municipalities, reported that they had not conducted any internal investigation on fraud or corruption between the years 1998–2002. It may be that they have not conducted any internal investigations, but the assumption that there would be no integrity violations regarding fraud and corruption seems – especially for the bigger more populous municipalities – improbable. The data from the city of Amsterdam makes this point clear.

When taking Amsterdam into account, the number of annual internal investigations increases by 75 per cent (from 102 in 1991 to 179 in 2003). This increase is wholly due to Amsterdam. The municipality of Amsterdam is unique in regard to its approach towards and attention to public integrity. From 1997 onwards, Amsterdam vested several bureaus, projects and initiatives especially designed to track, register and combat corruption and other integrity violations. The increase in internal investigations by the municipal administrative system of Amsterdam analogously developed with these various activities. Contrasted with other comparable cities, where there are no reasons to believe they would be corruption free, but in which no investigations were conducted, we might have evidence of an integrity paradox: those who pay more attention to certain violations will be more prone to track and investigate these violations, so that they may appear more corrupt, while that might not be the case. In other words: a large number of investigations could say more about the level of attention and openness, than about the actual levels of corruption and other integrity violations.

Thus, our research on internal investigations has raised an important interpretation problem: do more investigations into corruption and fraud indicate immaculate policy and attention or a highly corrupt institution? Although our data provide some evidence for the former explanation, more research is needed to reduce the leeway regarding the ‘integrity paradox’.

Research on Internal Investigations in the Dutch Police Force

The Dutch police force consists of 25 regional forces and a National Police Agency which provides certain specialised tasks. These 26 forces employ a total of about 45,000 officers. Before 1995 most forces had no central unit for internal investigations. Since 1995, all police forces have set up a Bureau of Internal Investigations in line with the Interior Ministry's agreements regarding police integrity policy. These bureaus conduct internal investigations whenever there is 'a suspicion of an infraction of disciplinary or criminal law' (Lamboos et al., 2002, p. 9).

In 2001, all Bureaus of Internal Investigations of the Dutch police forces were requested to provide data on all the internal investigations and integrity violations (according to the earlier given typology) conducted in the years 1999–2000 (Lamboos et al., 2002). All forces submitted data on the type of investigations, the misconduct investigated, the results of the investigations and the type of sanctions imposed and measures taken. Table 14.5 gives an overview of the results.

The total police force reported 1550 internal investigations on integrity violations for the years 1999–2000, which related to 1705 suspects. This means that over the years 1999–2000 a yearly average of 1.8 per cent of the Dutch police employees were subject to an internal investigation. About 0.5 per cent of the police employees received a formal sanction.

Private life misconduct was the integrity violation most frequently investigated, followed by the use of force and waste and abuse of organisational resources. There were few investigations into corruption. While most empirical research focuses mainly on corruption and abuse of authority, the results from our study indicate that a great variety of violations are subject to internal investigations.

One must be cautious however, when one wants to make inferences from these data regarding the extent of the police integrity problem. Differences between the various integrity violations are partly due to the likelihood of discovery and the willingness to conduct an investigation into the possible violations. This partly underlies the high incidence of investigations into, for example, the use of force (because any incidence of the use of force by an officer has to be reported and investigated) and the very low incidence of investigations into corruption. Here too, we are dealing with a dark number.

Discussing the Reliability and Validity of Research on Criminal Cases and Internal Investigations

The presented research in this section can be discussed on various methodological grounds. To discuss all forms of method bias is beyond the scope of this contribution. Instead, we will focus our methodological attention on the ability of the presented research to measure or estimate the prevalence and extent of corruption (and other integrity violations).

Research into internal investigations is valid for these internal research activities, but says very little about the actual prevalence and extent of misconduct. There is a

Table 14.5 Number of internal investigations and measures in the Dutch police force 1991–2000

Total	1999–2000
<i>Internal investigations</i> ²	1550
Suspects	1705
(of whom unknown)	138
Investigated specific	1876
Forms of misconduct	
Private life misconduct	371
Use of force	341
Abuse organisational resources	243
Abuse of information	217
Ill-treatment	195
Theft	183
Fraud	53
Investigative methods	40
Conflict of interest	32
Corruption	25
Gifts and discounts	3
Other	134
No information	39
Measures taken or sanctions	862

‘dark number’ of misconduct in the organisation which can be expected to remain unknown to those conducting the investigation. An additional problem here is that the dark number varies for different types of integrity violations, as it is dependent on the chance of discovery and the willingness to conduct an internal investigation.

There are additional problems, besides the issue of dark numbers, there are additional problems. First, the non-respondents could have significantly different behaviour regarding the various forms of misconduct. This non-response bias is especially relevant for our research on municipalities, in which we obtained a 77 per cent and a 46 per cent response respectively in our 1991 and 2003 surveys. We have no data on the non-respondents. Secondly, any form of misconduct is actually sensitive behaviour. Respondents could be willing to misrepresent their behaviour or the behaviour of their organisation, so as to provide a more ‘positive’ view of themselves or their institution. This evasive answer bias is difficult to assess.

Although we have some hints regarding the relationship, the mentioned methodological drawbacks make it very difficult to find a way out of the ‘integrity paradox’: do many internal investigations mean a corruption prone police force or municipality, or is it a product of superior attention to various forms of misconduct?

Further, the focus in research into internal investigations has been mainly with Dutch local government and the police force. Research into internal investigations for the whole of the Dutch public administration system is being conducted at the time of writing this chapter.

Estimations of Corruption in the Work Environment

In this section, we examine in more detail at surveys with estimations of the extent of corrupt behaviour in the work environment. This third type of research, that focuses more directly on corruption itself, clarifies that there is much more corruption than the internal investigations detect. By using the typology as described earlier, it becomes clear that bribery seems to be exceptional but that corruption-related types of unethical behaviour within organisations, according to the employees, are occurring more often.

Survey Among Dutch Police Officers

In 2003, we collected data by means of a questionnaire from a regional police organisation in the Netherlands. We have not reported on these data collections before.³ The police force was selected because safeguarding integrity is an important issue in this sector. The sample consisted of all employees of the participating police organisation. Respondents were not required to identify themselves in any way on the questionnaire and they were given assurance that no one from their organisation would have access to individual questionnaires. Respondents sent the completed questionnaire back to the independent researchers in a sealed envelope. The anonymity of respondents and confidentiality of the information collected was therefore guaranteed. In total, 755 completed and usable questionnaires were received. The questionnaires were accumulated into one dataset.

The questionnaire included questions about 64 different manifestations of unethical police behaviour and asked for the respondents' perception on the amount of integrity violations within the last twelve months within their own team or unit (i.e. their own work environment). They are not dealing with one's own transgressions, because the validity of those answers would be questionable. (we will return to this issue later). The scale of response for the frequency of deviant behaviour ranged from 0 = never, 1 = once, 2 = sometimes, 3 = regularly to 4 = often (on a weekly basis).

What do Dutch police officers think about the extent of integrity violations within their own work environment? Table 14.6 shows the perceived extent of 16 selected manifestations of misconduct for all nine types of integrity violations.⁴ The percentages represent the proportion of respondents answering never, once or sometimes and regularly or often.

Bribery is, according to the employees themselves, not occurring on a large scale. Of the respondents, 96 per cent never observed the acceptance of money or favours in exchange for (non) action as a functionary within their work environment in the

last 12 months, only 4 per cent observed this behaviour. Almost the same holds for being offered money or favours in exchange for (non) action as a functionary (93 per cent never, 6 per cent once or sometimes and about 1 per cent regularly or often). Keeping in mind that 30 police officers have reported that they noticed bribery in their team, this result is in line with our expectations that 'real' corruption is not a common practice within the Dutch police force. However, relying on perceptions as a valid indicator of the actual level of corruption is problematic as well. Employees will only have a limited view on what actually happens; corrupt colleagues will try to hide their 'dirty business' and most of the time their actions will take place outside the organisation and out of the sight of others.

When we move to corruption as nepotism, cronyism and patronage which have a higher incidence inside the organisation, we see that more employees observe these behaviours. Incidents of corruption, such as favouring of family and friends, was perceived by almost 20 per cent of the respondents and internal favouritism by the management by almost 50 per cent.

Also for the other (corruption-related) types of unethical behaviour like fraud and theft, conflict of (private and public) interest, improper use of authority, misuse and manipulation of information, discrimination and sexual harassment, waste and abuse of resources and private life misconduct, the perceived extent within the work unit in the last 12 months varies substantially.

In the last section, we will discuss how to interpret these results: what do they say about the actual amount of breaches of integrity within organisations?

Survey Among the Dutch Labour Force

The integrity violations described above and the frequency of their occurrence are not unique for the police. We also have information from a survey conducted by Kaptein (2001) among the Dutch labour force. Among this labour force, 1,000 randomly selected workers were asked their perceptions of the frequency of fifty identified integrity violations within their work department or unit. We report their perception of the occurrence of some of these behaviours in Table 14.7 (Kaptein, 2001, p. 14).

When we compare the results of the Dutch labour force against the results of the Dutch police force, we notice that although the percentages for the questioned integrity violations are higher in the labour force, a similar pattern still arises.

According to the employees themselves, real corruption such as neglecting tasks because of offered money or favours by external actors almost never occurs (93 per cent of the respondents answered never, 1 per cent answered regularly or often). Corruption like favouritism, on the contrary, seems to be a solid part of the internal organisational climate of Dutch corporations.

Table 14.6 Perceived extent of integrity violations within the Dutch police (n=755)

Integrity violations	Never	Once/sometimes	Regularly/often
<i>1 Corruption: bribing</i>			
Acceptance of money or favours in exchange for (non) action as a functionary	96%	3%	<1%
Being offered money or favours in exchange for (non) action as a functionary	93%	6%	<1%
<i>2 Corruption: nepotism, cronyism, patronage</i>			
Favouring friends or family from outside the organisation	81%	17%	2%
Internal favouritism by the management	51%	38%	11%
<i>3 Fraud and theft</i>			
Use of organisational resources for private purposes	39%	51%	10%
Working for private purposes during working hours	29%	60%	11%
Theft of organisational properties	82%	16%	2%
Attempts to influence a colleague to undo a ticket or fine given to a family member	71%	27%	2%
<i>4 Conflict of (private and public) interest</i>			
Arranging private discounts on goods and services using ones function	89%	11%	1%
Private life/ sideline activities that are in conflict with organisation interests	83%	17%	1%
<i>5 Improper use of authority</i>			
Improper and/or disproportionate violence	73%	25%	3%
<i>6 Misuse and manipulation of information</i>			
Carelessness with confidential (police) information	71%	27%	2%
<i>7 Discrimination and sexual harassment</i>			
Discrimination of homosexual colleagues	88%	10%	2%
Sexual intimidation	91%	9%	<1%
<i>8 Waste and abuse of resources</i>			
Carelessness with organisational properties	43%	46%	11%
<i>9 Private life misconduct</i>			
Setting a bad example in one's private life	53%	41%	6%

Table 14.7 Perceived extent of integrity violations within the Dutch labour force (n=1000)

Integrity violations	Occurs never	Occurs regularly to often
Neglect of tasks because of offered money or favours by external actors	93%	1%
The abuse of power / position	50%	14%
Internal favouritism within department	27%	33%
Favouring friends or family from outside the organisation	67%	8%
Arranging private discounts	69%	7%
Damaging sideline activities	63%	5%

Notes: regularly = once every quarter of a year, often = once a week.

Discussing the Reliability and Validity of Research on Estimations in the Work Environment

In this section, we will attempt to identify the measurement problems associated with the reliability and validity with this type of research. The question is: what do the perceptions of employees tell us about the actual level of corruption and other breaches of integrity within organisations?

It is not easy to determine how reliable this type of research is because the survey instrument is mainly used to *monitor* how employees think of integrity and integrity violations within the organisation and thereby *evaluate* the effect of integrity policies on organisational management. Surveys among employees are seldom repeated within short time periods and when repeated after a period of time results might (and should) differ as a consequence of the policies implemented by management. The surveys discussed in this paragraph, however, do show that the findings are in line with each other and result in similar patterns with regard to the different types of integrity violations.

This brings us to the validity of survey research. The question is what the perceptions of employees tell us about the actual level of corruption and other breaches of integrity within organisations.

The first problem has to do with what respondents *can* observe. Employees can only have a limited view on what actually happens. This holds for some integrity violations more than for others. Unethical behaviour that takes place outside the organisation will be harder to observe than behaviour that takes place inside the organisation. This is particularly true for private life misconduct as well as for work that takes place outside the office (for instance, police officers on patrol, or business people on the road). The fact that offenders will try to hide their actions, (e.g. bribery) and that some violations have no victims or do not need a third party, (e.g. fraud or

theft), makes the validity problem of relying on perceptions as a true reflection of the actual level of unethical behaviour even more problematic.

The second problem is to do with what respondents *will* observe. When asking respondents which types of integrity violations they perceive in their work environment, they will reflect in their answers their own specific experiences. More subjective impressions will also play. Respondents need to label what they see. They need to be aware of the different aspects of the (asked) type of integrity violation and need to recognise behaviours as manifestations of the problem. Discrimination and sexual harassment are especially not always recognised as such. The attention that management gives to unethical behaviour across policies, training, codes of conduct etc. can increase awareness among employees and it might be reflected in their observations as well.

Respondents' perceptions are not neutral. Besides awareness, the acceptability of behaviour will play a role in estimating what happens. Although we do not know exactly how respondents' evaluations of the asked behaviours influence their estimations (either underestimation or overestimation), we do expect that it does make a difference if the behaviour is widely accepted or not accepted within the organisation (for instance, the private use of working hours and organisational resources such as the telephone and the internet). Also, does in-group and out-group phenomena influences what is observed? This might explain the high prevalence of perceived favouritism by management.

The third problem has to do with what respondents *report*. Respondents might be reluctant to report what is really going on in the team because of loyalty to colleagues or loyalty to the organisation. This might be especially true for improper use of authority.

The fourth problem has to do with the way unethical behaviour is *measured*. As a result most survey research omits questions dealing with personal transgressions. We assume that the validity of those answers would be questionable. But social desirability always plays a role in this type of research. What is also important, is how exactly the question is formulated. So, will it make a difference if we question integrity violations by referring to more general behaviour instead of referring to very specific behaviour? For instance, should we ask about careless use of organisational resources or careless use of stationary? For other methodological problems in survey research, we confine ourselves by referring to Podsakoff et al. (2003) who described the various problems in behavioural research and their remedies.

We conclude that, although the validity of survey research into integrity violations exceeds the validity of reputation and internal investigation research, what we really find out is also limited. The perceptions of employees are, at best, an indicator of the actual amount of integrity violations present in the organisation.

Self-Reports of Individual Behaviour

Self-reports of individual behaviour are a promising route to fill up the gap left open by other research methodologies in the measurement of corruption. In the end, what we really want to know is who and how many the perpetrators are. Individual behaviour relates directly to the 'dark numbers' regarding misconduct. However, self-reports with regard to corruption research are only promising if they are unbiased. Given misconduct is a covert activity, many researchers are wary of the leap from 'image' or 'perception' research to research on personal experience. In light of the non-sampling biases of non-response and evasive answers, we will discuss the two main foci of research on individual behaviour: self-reports of victimisation and of individual sensitive and/or deviant behaviour.

Self-Reports of Victimisation

How often do Dutch citizens in their own country experience corruption? The Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement (NSCR) participated in a large-scale international comparative survey project called the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) that was conducted in 1989, 1992, 1996 and 2000. In more than 60 countries all across the globe and including the Netherlands, a representative sampling of 2,000 citizens were questioned about their experiences with diverse forms of crime (Nieuwbeerta, 2002). Since 1996, the respondents were also asked if they have experienced being a victim of corruption by type of government institution or category of civil servant. The exact question was: 'In some countries one can sometimes be confronted with corruption among civil servants. Has a civil servant, for example a customs agent, a policeman, or an inspector ever expected you to pay a bribe for his or her services?' And if so: '(The last time) what sort of civil servant was involved? Was it a governmental official, a customs agent or some sort of inspector?' (Nieuwbeerta et al., 2002, p. 169).

The findings show that corruption by civil servants occurs mostly in developing countries, followed by countries of Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the industrialised countries (Nieuwbeerta et al., 2002, p. 172). In Asia and Latin America, an average of about 20 per cent of the respondents reported to have been a victim of corruption (with Argentina and Indonesia at the top with a reported average of more than 30 per cent) and Central and Eastern Europe following with an average between 10 and 15 per cent. In industrialised countries corruption is rare: less than 1 per cent of the respondents reported to have been confronted with corruption by civil servants. The average score in the Netherlands is about 0.5 per cent.

Revealing that one has been a 'victim' of a corrupt practice is not as sensitive as revealing that one has been a perpetrator. Victimisation research can catch data on the people who stumbled unwillingly upon various forms of misconduct. However, it is not suited to uncover those who were willingly involved in the realms of misconduct. There are benefits in gathering data on self-reporting of deviant behaviour.

Self-Reports of Sensitive Deviant Behaviour

A promising route for the exploration of the base of our corruption iceberg would be to obtain unbiased self-reports of actual deviant behaviour. Corruption and other integrity violations are sensitive and covert activities. This sensitivity means many researchers shy away from conducting research on individual experiences, questioning the accuracy of these data, as respondents will not be willing to incriminate themselves. A technique which may overcome this problem is known as 'Randomised Response', to which we now turn.

'Randomised response' refers to techniques which, as a core characteristic, use the insertion of random error by an element of chance to provide the respondent optimal privacy protection when answering questions of a sensitive nature. It was the initial idea of Stanley Warner (1965) that the element of chance stemming from a randomisation device could inoculate responses to sensitive inquiries and thus reduce non-sampling bias. How does this work? Consider the following hypothetical situation. One finds oneself in a room full of academic colleagues. The speaker asks the attendants to raise their hands if they have ever twisted data so that the results became statistically significant or confirmed a hypothesis (example taken from Lensvelt-Mulders and De Leeuw, 2002). Probably nobody will raise his or her hand. But then the situation is changed. The speaker asks every attendant to flip a coin and to look if the throw is heads or tails, without revealing the outcome to others. The speaker then asks if those who have tails and/or who have ever reworked their data in an 'un-academic' way to raise their hand. Statistically half of all attendants will raise their hand due to a 'tails' score on their coin flip. If we assume 100 attendees, 50 persons should raise their hands. If 56 persons raise their hands, we can compute from the 100 attendees that 12 persons in the auditorium (12 per cent) have, at some point, unscientifically revised their data. But exactly who those people are will never be revealed. All the people with tails on their flipped coin protect the privacy of those who committed the frauds. The rationale is: if respondents are assured that their privacy is guarded then, they will be more inclined to cooperate and to respond truthfully.

This procedure can also be applied in a one-to-one setting. A respondent is redirected to a certain question or a certain response *via* a randomisation device. Part of the data obtained will then be misclassified. Due to this misclassification individual responses to sensitive questions have no definitive meaning, making it less threatening to admit to certain behaviours. But as the distribution of the misclassification is known by the use of the randomisation device (which should abide by the laws of elementary probability), an unbiased population estimate of the prevalence or extent of certain behaviour can be quite easily calculated.

Through the years, many improvements have increased the value and acceptance of this still highly unknown method (see Fox and Tracy 1986, for an overview). A meta-analysis which contained 35 years of randomised response comparison and validation data, showed that the randomised response technique gave more accurate and valid population estimates of the prevalence of sensitive behaviour than other techniques (Lensvelt-Mulders, Hox and Van Der Heijden, 2005).

The method has not been tested with regard to integrity violations in the public sphere and remains largely open with regard to quantitative data as the technique has been mostly tested towards the prevalence (which essentially is dichotomous; ‘yes’ or ‘no’) of criminal behaviour, drug use, tax evasions and abortions. We are preparing to test a special form of the randomised response technique with the use of a computer-assisted survey so as to obtain more unbiased estimations of the prevalence and extent of corruption and other integrity violations in a Dutch police force.⁵ This study will be a test case to see how well this technique and our adaptations perform in exploring the regions towards the base of our iceberg. We will explore whether this technique can delve into the ‘dark numbers’ by comparing it to more standard data gathering techniques.

Discussing the Reliability and Validity of Research on Self-Reports

Revealing that one has been a ‘victim’ of a corrupt practice is not as sensitive as revealing that one has been a perpetrator. As already stated, victimisation research can catch data on the people who stumbled unwillingly upon various forms of misconduct but is not suited to uncover those who were willingly involved in the realms of misconduct. Research on individual deviant behaviour remains open terrain in the science of misconduct, mainly because researchers have to overcome a problem that is felt in all research on latent variables, but which becomes pressing regarding individual behaviour: non-response and evasive answer bias. A way to work around the silly assumption – that truthful responses can be obtained *via* direct questioning – is to use randomised response techniques, which through the use of misclassification of data *via* a randomisation device, can delve into the ‘darker numbers’ of certain behaviours. But these methods, too, have their drawbacks.

The first is that the randomised response technique is inefficient compared to direct questioning of any sort. The insertion of random error in the responses results in variance inflation as the use of the randomisation device leads to additional variance. The technique is thus less reliable (in terms of variance) with similar numbers of respondents when compared to direct questioning of any sort. This means that the population sample has to be larger to obtain similar levels of reliability, which also means extra costs. The benefits of lowering bias however, outweigh the extra costs. The issue of lowering bias takes us to the second remark.

The randomised response method has a stronger stance in reducing evasive answer (response) bias than in reducing non-response bias. The method will reduce item-specific non-response of respondents who feel uncomfortable with certain sensitive items. Certain subgroups of the population who are notorious non-respondents will still have to be over-sampled. But when they agree to cooperate, evasive answer bias and item-specific non-response can be expected to be lower among these non-respondents compared to methods of direct questioning. In any case, any reduction of bias gives more leverage when assessing sensitive topics.

The third remark is also related to the issue of bias. It will still be able to cheat on the randomised response method by not complying with the rules. Sensitive

behaviour will always be underestimated, due to the respondents who will refuse or answer evasively under any circumstances. However, the underestimation of sensitive behaviour under the randomised response conditions can be expected – due to the level of protection it offers – to be smaller compared to other data collection methods (see Lensvelt-Mulders, 2003; Lensvelt-Mulders, Hox and Van Der Heijden, 2005; and Van Der Heijden et al., 2000). Self-reports of sensitive behaviour obtained *via* randomised response techniques yield a promising route for research on integrity violations because any reduction of bias will increase leverage when assessing sensitive topics, thus justifying the effort.

Exploring the Corruption Iceberg: Summary and Conclusions

In the previous sections, we have outlined a number of research projects on corruption in the Netherlands. In this final section, we will summarise some of the results and reflect on the usefulness of the methods. As explained in our second section, we have developed a broad typology of integrity violations of which corruption is a specific subpart, instead of using an ‘umbrella’ concept of corruption. This puts our findings on the prevalence and extent of corruption in perspective.

We started with corruption *reputation* research. The surveys that measure the corruption reputation of the Netherlands offer a clear and stable picture that the country is viewed as among the least corrupt in the world. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2004 showed that the Netherlands is ranked tenth with a score of 8.7. In our expert panel survey conducted in 1994, which surveyed 257 experts from 49 countries including experts from the Netherlands, the extent of public corruption and fraud among politicians and among civil servants was estimated at 2.5 per cent and 4 per cent respectively.

Secondly, we reported on research about *criminal cases and internal investigations*. The image that is formed from our research on criminal cases is that the structure of the top of the corruption iceberg in the Netherlands consists of a limited number of criminal cases and convictions each year (20–50 cases, 6–17 convictions). Research on internal investigations, from which criminal cases can follow, showed that in municipalities 179 internal investigations into corruption and fraud were conducted annually over the years 1999–2003 of which 34 per cent concerned corruption. The Dutch Police Force reported 1,550 internal investigations over the years 1999–2000 of which 25 were directly related to corruption.

Surveys with estimations by employees of the extent of *corrupt behaviour in their work environment* are the third type of research. A survey among 755 Dutch police officers from the same regional police force showed that 4 per cent of the police officers noticed bribery at least once in their team in the 12 months preceding the survey. For corruption which included nepotism, cronyism and patronage, we found much higher percentages. From the surveyed police officers, 19 per cent perceived favouritism of family and friends at least once in their work environment and 59 per cent favouritism by the management. A similar survey set of 1,000 randomly selected

workers in the Dutch labour force showed similar patterns for corruption: 7 per cent bribery, 33 per cent favouritism of family and friends, and 73 per cent favouritism by the management.

The last type of research we described was *self-reports* of individual behaviour. There are two main foci in this line of research: self-reports of victimisation and individual sensitive and/or deviant behaviour. The findings from the International Crime Victims Survey showed that about 0.5 per cent of the Dutch respondents report to have been confronted with corruption by civil servants. Victimisation research can catch data on the person who stumbled unwillingly upon various forms of misconduct but is not suited to uncover those who were willingly involved in the realms of public misbehaviour. Self-reports of individual sensitive behaviour collected with randomised response techniques are a promising route to fill up the gap left open by other research methodologies regarding the measurement of corruption. We have summarised the findings of our different research projects on corruption in Table 14.8.

An important question is how to interpret these results. What do they say about the actual level of corruption in the Netherlands and how reliable and valid are the outcomes based on the different research methods?

Corruption reputation research by experts, which estimates the amount of corruption in the Netherlands, reveals a similar pattern whenever such research is undertaken. The Netherlands appears to be non-corrupt in the eyes of the business people and risk analysts that estimate the country's integrity. Experts who were questioned in a panel survey confirm this image. In other words, the reliability of this type of work is not the problem. However, the stability of these expert estimations might also contain a risk for the validity of reputation research. A reputation is about how a country or organisation has come to be known and therefore reputations refer more to general perceptions than specific experiences. Known or felt reputations carry themselves into reputation research. The outcomes are questionable when we want to view them as accurate estimations of the actual level of the corruption problem.

Research on criminal cases and convictions based on the corruption articles in the Penal Code support the image that the corruption problem in the Netherlands is very limited. However, we have to keep in mind that such data only provides information about the 'tip of the iceberg' of cases being discovered, investigated and prosecuted.

Beneath these criminal cases are the internal investigations. Our research in Dutch municipalities clearly shows that the interpretation of the number of internal investigations is difficult. A crucial aspect to take into consideration is that data about investigations appears to reflect the priority that the organisation gives to the struggle against corruption instead of being an indicator of the amount of corruption. We refer to this phenomenon as the 'integrity paradox'.

To start an internal investigation, somebody will have to report (possible) corrupt behaviour. In survey research we have conducted, employees indicated the amount of corrupt and corruption related behaviour they observed in their work environment. The findings lead to the conclusion that only a fraction of what employees perceive becomes the subject of an internal investigation.

Table 14.8 Overview of our research projects on corruption in the Netherlands

Research focus	Period	Organisational focus	Findings on corruption
1 Reputations CPI Expert Panel	1985–2004 1996	Dutch public and political sectors <i>Ibidem.</i>	The Netherlands are perceived to be relatively clean
2 Criminal cases	1965–2000	Dutch public and political sectors	20–50 criminal cases annually from which 6–17 convictions follow
3 Internal investigations	1999–2003 1999–2000	Dutch municipalities Dutch police force	179 internal investigations into corruption and fraud annually of which 34 per cent concerned corruption 1550 internal investigations of which 25 were directly related to corruption
4 Estimations in the direct work environment	2003 2000	One Dutch regional police force Randomly selected workers from the labour force	4 per cent noticed bribery, for corruption like nepotism, cronyism and patronage we found much higher percentages 7 per cent noticed bribery, for corruption like nepotism, cronyism and patronage we found much higher percentages
5 Self reports of individual behaviour Victimisation research Randomised response – techniques	2000	Representative sample of Dutch population One Dutch regional police force	0.5 per cent of the Dutch respondents report having been confronted with corruption by civil servants Preparations for testing are underway

A major disadvantage of all the above sources and research methods is, of course, that the corruptor and the corrupted will try to hide their behaviour where possible. Therefore, self-report research might add valuable information. Until now, some victim research has been undertaken; it shows that the percentages of Dutch citizens confronted with (the necessity of) bribing public sector functionaries is very low. In the near future, we hope to report on data collected with 'Randomised Response Techniques'.

However, we have to keep in mind that we can never bring all corruption to the surface. Researchers on corruption will have to live with the weight of the 'dark numbers'. We are exploring different parts of the iceberg in order to find out more about its characteristics as well as its extent. All presented methods have their problems as well as possibilities. All our research contributes to our knowledge about the complex and diverse nature of the corruption phenomenon. Therefore, it is necessary to triangulate on the same research object. Corruption research should involve the collection and comparison of information from different sources and methods, at different levels and in different sectors as well as in different points in time. But also, when we want to find out more about the relationships between the findings of the different methods, it would be very helpful to use these at the same time in the same organisation(s).

For the future research agenda, it seems especially worthwhile (1) to gain more clarity and thus comparability concerning the conceptual framework on corruption; (2) to work on methods that try to measure the extent of corruption through self-reporting; (3) to add research on the willingness to report corruption; and (4) to invest in research questions on the workings of the corruption process that give insight into the variables that are crucial for measuring the extent of corruption. The future research agenda on corruption could provide an inroad to possibly the most valid question of all: just how steep are the slopes of our iceberg?

Notes

- 1 The authors work at the Department of Public Administration and Organization Science of the Free University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Leo Huberts is Professor of Public Administration and Integrity of Governance. Karin Lasthuizen and Carel Peeters both work as researchers within the research group Integrity of Governance.
- 2 Note that an internal investigation can have multiple suspects and forms of misconduct as its focus.
- 3 We did report on survey data within the Dutch police force from the so-called Integrity Thermometer: Kaptein, 1998; Kaptein and Van Reenen, 2001; Kaptein and Wempe, 2002; Lasthuizen, Huberts and Kaptein, 2002; Lasthuizen, Huberts and Kaptein, 2004. The data, however, are less extensive about corruption-related behaviours.
- 4 We selected 16 out of the 64 integrity violations that were included in our survey. These 16 manifestations of corrupt and corruption-related behaviours give a representative overview of what kind of unethical behaviours are perceived by Dutch police officers in their work environment.

- 5 We will use a computer assisted qualitative (dichotomous) and quantitative 'forced' response method, which redirects the respondent to a certain forced answer *via* a randomisation device. This project is done in cooperation with the Department of Methods and Statistics, Utrecht University.

References

- Barker, T. and Carter, D.L. (1996), *Police Deviance*, 3rd edition, Anderson, Cincinnati.
- Benjamin, M. (1990), *Splitting the Difference: Compromising and Integrity in Ethics and Politics*, University Press of Kansas, Kansas.
- Bovens, M.A.P. (1996), 'De integriteit van de bedrijfsmatige overheid (The Integrity of Businesslike Government)', in M.A.P. Bovens and A. Hemelrijck (eds), *Het verhaal van de moraal*, Boom, Amsterdam/ Meppel, pp. 150–70.
- Bull, M.J. and Newell, J.L. (eds) (2003), *Corruption in Contemporary Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire and New York.
- Caiden, G.E. (1991), 'What Really is Public Maladministration?', *Public Administration Review*, vol. 51, no. 6, pp. 486–93.
- Caiden, G.E. (2001), 'Corruption and Governance', in E. Caiden, O.P. Dwivedi and J. Jabbra (eds), *Where Corruption Lives*, Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, pp. 15–37.
- Caiden, G.E., Dwivedi, O.P. and Jabbra, J. (eds) (2001), *Where Corruption Lives*, Kumarian Press, Bloomfield.
- Crank, J.P. and Caldero, M.A. (2000), *Police Ethics: The Corruption of Noble Cause*, Anderson, Cincinnati.
- Fijnaut, C. and Huberts, L.W.J.C. (eds) (2002), *Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement*, Kluwer Law International, Dordrecht.
- Fleurke, F. and Huberts, L.W.J.C. (1995), 'Bestuurlijke integriteit: ervaringen en perspectieven (Public Integrity: Experiences and Perspectives)', *Bestuurswetenschappen*, vol. 49, no. 5/6, pp. 385–402.
- Fox, J.A. and Tracy, P.E. (1986), *Randomized Response: A Method for Sensitive Surveys*, Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, no. 58, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills.
- Gardiner, J.A. (2002), 'Defining Corruption', in A.J. Heidenheimer and M. Johnston (eds), *Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London, pp. 25–40.
- Heidenheimer, A.J. and Johnston, M. (eds) (2002), *Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London.
- Heijden, P.G.M. Van der Gils, G., Van Bouts, J. and Hox, J.J. (2000), 'A Comparison of Randomized Response, Computer-Assisted Self-Interview, and Face-to-Face Direct Questioning: Eliciting Sensitive Information in the Context of Welfare and Unemployment Benefit', *Sociological Methods and Research*, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 505–37.
- Hoetjes, B.J.S. (1991), 'Over de schreef: Het schemergebied tussen ambtenaar en burger (Overstepping the Mark: The Twilightzone between Public Official and Citizen)', *Justitiële Verkenningen*, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 8–32.
- Huberts, L.W.J.C. (1993), 'Omvang en bestrijding van bestuurlijke criminaliteit (The Extent of and Fight against Public Wrongdoing)', *Justitiële Verkenningen*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 51–69.
- Huberts, L.W.J.C. (1995), 'Public Corruption and Fraud in the Netherlands: Research and Results', *Crime, Law and Social Change*, vol. 22, pp. 307–21.

- Huberts, L.W.J.C. (1996), *Expert Views on Public Corruption around the Globe, Research Report on the Views of an International Expert Panel*, PSPA Publications, Amsterdam.
- Huberts, L.W.J.C. (2005, in print), 'Integriteit en integritisme in bestuur en samenleving (Integrity and Integritism in Governance and Society, Inaugural Address)', Oratie Vrije Universiteit 2005.
- Huberts, L.W.J.C. and Van den Heuvel, J.H.J. (eds) (1999), *Integrity at the Public-private Interface*, Shaker, Maastricht.
- Huberts, L.W.J.C., Hulschebosch, H., Lasthuizen, K. and Peeters, C.F.W. (2004), *Nederland fraude- en corruptieland? De omvang, achtergronden en afwikkeling van corruptie- en fraudeonderzoeken in Nederlandse gemeenten in 1991 en 2003 (The Netherlands, a Fraudulent and Corrupt Country? The Magnitude, Backgrounds and Measures regarding Corruption and Fraud Investigations in Dutch Municipalities in 1991 and 2003)*, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.
- Huberts, L.W.J.C., Pijl, D. and Steen, A. (1999), 'Integrity and Corruption', in C. Fijnaut, E. Muller and U. Rosenthal (eds), *Police: Studies on the Organization and its Functioning*, Samsom, Alphen aan den Rijn, pp. 57–79.
- Kaptein, M. (1998), *Ethics Management*, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
- Kaptein, M. (2001), 'De integriteitsbarometer voor organisaties, Special Organisatie-criminaliteit (The Integrity Barometer for Organizations)', *Bedrijfskunde*, vol. 73, no. 3, pp. 12–18.
- Kaptein, M. and Van Reenen, P. (2001), 'Integrity Management of Police Organizations', *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management*, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 281–300.
- Kaptein, M. and Wempe, J. (2002), *The Balanced Company: A Corporate Integrity Approach*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Klockars, C.B. (1997), *Conceptual and Methodological Issues in the Study of Police Integrity*, Paper presented to the Advisory Panel Meeting of the Project on Police Integrity, December 16, Washington DC.
- Klockars, C.B., Kutnjak, I., Ivkovich S., Harver, W.E. and Haberfeld, M.R. (2000), *The measurement of Police Integrity: Research in Brief*, National Institute of Justice, May 2000.
- Lambooy, M.E.D., Huberts, L.W.J.C., Van der Steeg, M. and Nieuwendijk, A. (2002), 'The Monitor Internal Investigations Police: Dimensions of Police Misconduct', paper presented at the 2002 American Society of Criminology Conference, Chicago, 12–16 November 2002.
- Lasthuizen, K., Huberts, L.W.J.C. and Kaptein, M. (2002), 'Integrity Problems in the Police Organization: Police Officers' Perceptions Reviewed', in M. Pagon (ed.), *Policing in Central and Eastern Europe, Deviance, Violence, and Victimization*, Leicester: Scarman Centre University of Leicester and Ljubljana: College of Police and Security Studies, pp. 25–37.
- Lasthuizen, K., Huberts, L.W.J.C. and Kaptein, M. (2004), 'Analyse van Integriteitsopvattingen (Analysis of Integrity Perceptions)', in L.W.J.C. Huberts and J. Naeyé (eds), *Integriteit van de Politie, Verslag van onderzoek naar politieke integriteit in Nederland*, Te verschijnen in 2005 als publicatie van Politie en Wetenschap, Uitgeverij Kerckebosch, Zeist.
- Lawton, A. (1998), *Ethical Management for the Public Services*, Open University Press, Buckingham and Philadelphia.
- Lensvelt-Mulders, G.J.L.M. (2003), 'Randomized Response Technieken voor het Onderzoek van Sociaal Gevoelige Onderwerpen (Randomized Response Techniques for Research into Socially Sensitive Topics)', in MarktOnderzoeks-Associatie, *Ontwikkelingen in het Marktonderzoek Jaarboek 2003*, Uitgeverij de Vrieseborch, Haarlem, pp. 59–74.

- Lensvelt-Mulders, G.J.L.M., Hox, J. and Van der Heijden, P.G.M. (2005), 'Meta-Analysis of Randomized Response Research: 35 Years of Validation', *Sociological Methods and Research*, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 319–48.
- Lensvelt-Mulders, G.J.L.M. and Leeuw, E. de (2002), 'Vragen naar gevoelige informatie (Asking for Sensitive Information)', *Facta*, no. 34–5.
- Menzel, D.C. and Carson, K.J. (1999), 'A Review and Assessment of Empirical Research on Public Administration Ethics: Implications for Scholars and Managers', *Public Integrity*, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 239–64.
- Montefiori, A. and Vines, D. (eds) (1999), *Integrity in the Public and Private Domains*, Routledge, London.
- Nelen, H. and Nieuwendijk, A. (2003), *Geen ABC: Analyse van Rijksrecherche-onderzoeken naar ambtelijke en bestuurlijke corruptie (No ABC: Analysis of Federal Police Investigations of Official and Political Corruption)*, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, Den Haag.
- Nieuwebeerta, P. (ed.) (2002), *Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective, Results from the International Crime Victims Survey, 1989–2000*, Boom Juridische uitgevers, Den Haag.
- Nieuwebeerta, P., de Geest, G. and Siegers, J. (2002), 'Corruption in Industrialised and Developing Countries', in P. Nieuwebeerta (ed.), *Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective, Results from the International Crime Victims Survey 1989–2000*, Boom Juridische, Uitgevers, pp. 163–82.
- Nye, J.S. (1967), 'Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 417–27.
- Podsakoff, P.M., MacKenzie, S.B. and Lee, J.Y. (2003), 'Common Method Variance in Behavioral Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and Recommended Remedies', *Journal of Applied Psychology*, vol. 88, no. 5, pp. 879–903.
- Pollock, J.M. (1998), *Ethics in Crime and Justice: Dilemmas and Decisions*, 3rd edition, Wadsworth, Belmont, CA.
- Pope, J. (2000), *Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System*, Transparency International, Berlin.
- Preston, N., Sampford, C. with Connors, C. (2002), *Encouraging Ethics and Challenging Corruption: Reforming Governance in Public Institutions*, The Federation Press, Sydney.
- Solomon, B. (1999), *A Better Way to Think about Business: How Personal Integrity Leads to Corporate Success*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Uhr, J. (1999), 'Institutions of Integrity: Balancing Values and Verification in Democratic Government', *Public Integrity*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 94–106.
- Van den Heuvel, J.H.J., Huberts, L.W.J.C. and Verberk, S. (1999), *Integriteit in drievoud, Een onderzoek naar gemeentelijk integriteitsbeleid (Triple Integrity, Research into Local Integrity Policies)*, Lemma, Utrecht.
- Van Hulten, M. (2002), *Corruptie, Onbekend, onbemind, alomtegenwoordig (Corruption. Unknown, Disliked, Omnipresent)*, Boom, Amsterdam.
- Warner, S.L. (1965), 'Randomized Response: A Survey Technique for Eliminating Evasive Answer Bias', *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, vol. 60, pp. 63–9.